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be enough to meet the coming challenges to its governance
and democratic legitimacy.
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Since the beginning of the eurozone debt crisis three years ago, the member states have been forced to
change the governance of the eurozone in a long period of crisis management. Daniela Schwarzer
looks over the major changes to the EU’s governance structure, arguing that the European Council,
Germany, and the European Central Bank have moved to the centre stage, often leading to the
marginalization of other supranational actors and smaller member states in decision making. She
argues that while the eurozone has shown a remarkable capacity to adjust thus far, it may need far
more fundamental reform to its institutional set-up if it is to cope with looming problems of
governance and legitimacy.
Since the sovereign debt crisis hit the euro area in 2010, most attention has been paid to crisis management
decisions, i.e. financial aid packages, debt restructuring or behind-the-scenes-action by the European Central Bank.
In order to fully understand the evolution of the euro area, it is crucial to also look at the considerable degree of
explicit and implicit changes which impact today’s governance set-up of the euro area and hence decision-making
dynamics and power relationships.
A first observation is that, in the course of crisis management and in particular through its first permanent President
installed by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council and later the Eurozone summit, have become the center of
decision-making. This not only implies a potential loss of influence for the European Commission and the European
Parliament, two of the supranational institutions of the EU, it also means that member states matter more and that
they matter according to their relative weight.
European Council Summit Credit: President of the European Council (Creative Commons
BY NC ND)
Second, and this is closely related to the first point, the German government has, partly involuntarily, moved to
center stage. Germany not only has by far the largest economy, but recently also one of the most dynamic ones in
the EU. Thanks to painful adjustments in previous years, it had turned into Europe’s engine of growth by 2010. It is
the most important guarantor and creditor for fellow euro area member states through its contribution of 27% of the
European Stability Mechanism. Meanwhile, domestic conditions have imposed serious constraints on Germany’s
government that have rarely been seen in the period of post-war European integration.
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This has consequences: Germany was initially reluctant to help Greece, and has pushed for tougher rules and
sanctions in policy coordination and for the creation of a European insolvency procedure. Germany’s unusually
uncooperative strategies to push for its interests have made its role and commitment to the EU one of the key issues
in the debate on the future of Europe, in particular since it seemed to give up its previous support for supranational
institutions by calling for more intergovernmentalism. German efforts to export its own economic policy agenda have
also resulted in a bilateralisation of conflicts over measures to cope with the debt crisis.
For two years, Germany’s chancellor Merkel teamed up with France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy to define the
agenda of the European Council or the Euro Area Summit. But if decisions of crisis management and governance
reform are taken among the Heads of States and Government without a major contribution by supranational actors,
this marginalizes small and medium-sized member states. Unsurprisingly, they have harshly criticized the dominant
role of the large member states, for instance the Franco-German Deauville compromise on the reform of the euro
area of October 2010.
Third, if there is one institution whose factual role in economic governance has changed, it is that of the European
Central Bank (ECB). It no longer only runs the euro area’s monetary policy, but has evolved into the only crisis
manager that is willing and able to ensure the survival of the euro area. Its prominent rule in day-to-day crisis
management also leverages its political influence in two regards. First, when it came to debating governance
reforms. Second, the ECB at a certain point became directly involved with disciplining member states to implement
reforms on the domestic level. Moreover, it is also part of the so-called Troika composed of European Commission,
ECB, and IMF representatives who negotiate with, and monitor progress in those member states which have
received an aid package.
Fourth, the establishment of the permanent European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM) has changed the political
economy of the euro area. First of all, conditionality attached to loans has proven to be the most effective disciplining
device for disciplining national economic and fiscal policies. In the future, it is conceivable that the ESM may be at
the core of budgetary and economic policy coordination for those member states that require loans in times of
liquidity shortage. The ESM could perhaps even develop into a more pro-active actor, if should one day be able to
provide “preventive loans” before a crisis actually hits, meaning it can extend its role in supporting structural
adaptation processes. If it indeed turns into the institutional hub for policy coordination, this raises questions of
democratic accountability and legitimacy.
Fifth, a number of new procedures for closer surveillance and coordination of budgetary and economic policy have
strengthened attempts to realign domestic policy choices with jointly defined European targets. European Financial
Supervisory structures have been established, and a banking union is in the making. Euro summit meetings are now
to be held after European Council meetings at least twice a year to “provide strategic orientations on the economic
and fiscal policies in the euro area”. However, none of these measures actually involves a transfer of competencies
or a re-gaining of joint decision-making capacity, for instance, in the field of macro-economic policy, which has been
long lost by member states which have given up monetary authority.
While the euro area has shown a remarkable capacity to adjust the functioning of its governance below the levels
needing Treaty change, a more explicit and fundamental reform may be required in order to account for problems of
governance efficiency and, increasingly, problems of legitimacy. The current institutional set-up has thus far only
incrementally adapted to the inner and outer challenges faced by the eurozone. It has largely found success by not
impacting more strongly on national sovereignty and by not strengthening supranational policy making based on its
own sources of legitimacy. However, this arrangement will not be able to solve the collective action problems
inherent in the EMU’s asymmetric set-up, namely a centralized monetary policy and insufficient integration in the
fields of economic, budgetary and financial policy.
This article is based on The Euro Area Crises, Shifting Power Relations and Institutional Change in the European
Union, from the December 2012 issue of Global Policy.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
2/3
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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